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& L,, where each L, is a literal. We call such clauses generally Horn clauses. Any such endeavour has to give a coherent, formal treatment of inconsistency (in the sense of two-valued logic). Thus, as a second contribution, we give a robust semantics for generally Horn programs that allows us to "make sense" of sets of generally Horn clauses that are inconsistent (in the two-valued logic sense). This applies to the design of very large knowledge bases where inconsistent information is often present.
Motivation
Over the past few years, several researchers have made attempts to allow programming with sets of non-Horn clauses [20, 22] . However, there has been relative lack of success in giving model-theoretic and fixpoint semantics to such extensions. The main reason for this lack of success has been due to the fact that sets of non-Horn clauses may be inconsistent.
Thus, certain programs may mean "nothing" simply because they have no models.
However, if logic programming is to be a pragmatic tool for the development of knowledge bases, it must have some means for dealing with inconsistent knowledge. Take for example an expert system developed by a team of logic programmers.
Each programmer might have acquired information from various domain experts. It is very common for experts to disagree (often strongly). Thus, the knowledge base so developed might contain inconsistent information. Pioneering work has been done on reasoning in the presence of inconsistent information by da Costa [lo-131 and Belnap [7] . Logics of this kind are often called paraconsistent logics. Recently, in an interesting paper, Fitting [14] has given a declarative semantics for reasoning in the presence of inconsistent information. Under Fitting's semantics, the sentence A&lA would not be falsified by the interpretation that assigns the truth value I to A (where _L is the truth value unknown of Kleene [ 17, 191) . Thus, A v -iA @ A & 1A is true in any Kleene interpretation of the kind discussed by Fitting in which the truth value of A is I, i.e. unknown. We feel that the sentence A &lA should be assigned the truth value inconsistent (with respect to the intuition of two valued logic) rather than unknown. This distinction is made in detail in [7] .
Perlis [21, p. 1801 has argued that methods must be found for reasoning in the presence of inconsistent information. Paraconsistent [4, lo-131 logics provide what seems to be the only way known thus far to declaratively characterize arbitrary sets of clauses (that may or may not be inconsistent). The first paraconsistent logic programming languages were developed in [I, 9, 23, 241 . As in [24] , we shall use the device of annotated atoms (liter&) instead of using the negation symbol. It will be clear from Theorem 3.7 below that there is no loss of generality in doing so. In Section 2, we shall introduce the class of generally Horn programs and then investigate the semantics of programs in this class in Sections 3 and 4. A decidable subset of the class of generally Horn programs is introduced in Section 5 and it is shown that this class possesses some interesting model theoretic properties. The operational semantics of generally Horn programs is discussed in Sections 6 and 7.
Generally Horn logic programs: syntax
We assume the reader is familiar with the usual syntactic notions of terms, atoms and literals. Any undefined expressions used in this paper may be found in Lloyd [ 181. The set Y = {I, t, f, T} is the set of truth values of our four-valued logic. The truth values I, t, f, T correspond, respectively, to the truth values *', T, F, TF of Visser [27] and None, T, F, Both of Belnap [7] and stand, respectively, for "undefined", true (in the intuitive sense of two-valued logic), false (also in the two-valued sense), and "over-defined" (which may also be thought of as inconsistent in the intuition of two-valued logic). We define an ordering < on 9 as follows. The ordering < is represented by the Hasse diagram given in Fig. 1 Intuitively, the annotated atom A : t may be read as a rough approximation to "A is known to be true". Similarly, the annotated atom A: f may be regarded as saying "A is known to be false". This is only meant as a rough aid to intuition, and we are not committing ourselves to any epistemic consequences of this point of view.
Definition 2.3
(1) Any annotated atom is a formula. (Atoms are the usual atomic formulas of first-order logic).
(2) If A: p is an annotated atom, then 1A: p is a formula.
(3 The notion of a substitution is similar to that in [18] . Applying a substitution 0 to an annotated literal A: p results in the annotated literal A@ : p. The notion of applying a substitution is extended in the obvious way to a conjunction of annotated literals, and to gh-clauses. Definition 2.5. If A : p and B : p are annotated literals, then A : p and B : p are said to be unijiuble (with mgu 0) iff A and B are unifiable (with mgu 0). Note that p need not equal p as we are not defining the result of the unification yet.
Definition 2.6. A generalized Horn program (GHP) is a finite set of gh-clauses.
Generally Horn logic programs: semantics
In this paper, we will consider only "Herbrand-like" interpretations [ 181, i.e. the universe of individuals in the interpretation consists of all and only the ground terms of the language being interpreted. Unless explicitly specified otherwise, throughout the rest of this paper, the set of individuals in models and interpretations will be a Herbrand universe. We will consider an interpretation I as a function I : BL + 9 ' where BL is the Herbrand base under consideration. In this paper, we give a non-classical interpretation to the + symbol, i.e. we do not treat it as classical material implication.
In particular, the equivalence of A v 1B and A e B does not hold. This is necessary because, in general, A: t v A: f may not be a tautology. This formula asserts (in an intuitionistic fashion) the sentence
A formula is closed iff it contains no free occurrences of variables. We use the notation (V)F and (3)F to denote the universal closure and existential closure, respectively, of the formula F.
Definition 3.3 (Satisfaction).
We write I k F to say that I satisfies E An interpretation I
(1) satisfies the formula F iff I satisfies each of its closed instances, i.e. for each variable symbol x occurring free in F, and each variable free term t, F( t/x) is satisfied by I (here F( t/x) denotes the replacement of all free occurrences of x in F by t), (2) satisfies the closed annotated atom A: p iff I(A) 3 p, (3) satisfies the closed annotated literal 1A : p iff it satisfies A : lp, (4) satisfies the closed formula (3x)F iff for some variable free term t, I k F( t/x), (5) satisfies the closed formula (Vx)F iff for every variable free term t, I + F( t/x), (6) satisfies the closed formula F, + Fz iff I does not satisfy F2 or I k F,, [7] and Visser [27] with respect to our definition of negation. Their difinition makes l(Both) = None and l(None) = Both. Our definition seems to be more appropriate with regard to the known thaf intuition given to the annotated atoms. The above theorem assures us that the device of annotations is powerful enough to make the use of negated atoms unnecessary.
Therefore, from here on, we will always assume that GHPs do not contain any negated literals (with negations being implicitly present in the form of atoms annotated with f). This GHP has exactly one model, viz. the interpretation that assigns the truth value T to p(u). This is in keeping with our intuition which says that this program contains contradictory information (in the two valued sense). This GHP has several models as follows.
1, : I,(P(~)) = t; I,(p(b)) = t, I,: Up(a)) = t; bSp(bJ) = .L 1,: UP(Q)) = t; MP(b)) = f, 1,: h(p(a)) = T; b(p(b)) = T, f~: I,(P(~)) = f; I,(p(b)) = t, 1,: Mp(a)) = t; Mp(b)) = T, L: UP(~)) = 1;
1,: f,(p(a)) = 1;
The proliferation of models may appear somewhat bewildering, but it is important to observe that the GHP G has a least mode1 (viz. 14) and a greatest mode1 (viz.
1,). The least mode1 says that from G, it is not known that p(a) is true and it is not known that p(b) is true. Similarly, the model, I3 says that if it is known that p(a)
is false then it is known that p(b) is true.
Having defined the models of GHP, we now proceed to define a certain monotone operator from interpretations to interpretations. We then relate the prefixpoints' of this operator with the models of Generalized Horn Programs.
(Pre-)fixpoint semantics
It has now become a standard practice in logic programming research to try and naturally characterize the models of a program in terms of the (possibly pre-or post-)2 fixpoints of a certain monotone operator usually denoted by Tp. If S is a subset of a complete lattice L, then u S and n S denote, respectively, the least upper bound of S and the greatest lower bound of S. Before proceeding to investigate the fixpoints of TG, we show that the pre-fixpoints of TG are exactly the models of G. of TG assures us that TG has a fixpoint, and hence a pre-fixpoint, and hence a model. In addition, as TG is monotone, and as the set of interpretations (over 5) is a complete lattice, the least fixpoint and the least pre-fixpoint of TG must coincide, thus giving us the proof of the following result. Unfortunately, monotonicity by itself does not guarantee us that the least fixpoint of TG is semi-computable (i.e. recursively enumerable). We show, nevertheless, that this is indeed the case. Definition 4.6. We define the special interpretation A to be the interpretation that assigns the value I to all members of BG. Similarly, the interpretation V assigns the value T to all members of BG. where cx is a successor ordinal and A a limit ordinal (n denotes glb). 
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), the answer to this question is negative. However, the reason for this is that TGJO is the greatest model of G. Indeed, each T,&cy is a mode1 of G, since it is a prefixed-point of TG_ Thus, we are led to ask the following. One answer is immediately forthcoming.
We should like an acceptable GHP to be one that expresses consistent knowledge. Before proceeding to finish our answer to the above question, it is necessary to introduce a new definition. We are therefore interested in those models of G that are nice. Now it should be apparent that in view of the fact that T is a formalization of the notion of both true andfulse which is exactly the notion of inconsistency, we should like to characterize the acceptable GHPs to be exactly those GHPs that possess a nice model. Thus, we have now answered the preceding question in full:
(1) The models of a GHP that interest us are the nice models.
(2) The GHPs that we shall be interested in are the acceptable ones.
It is appropriate, therefore, to identify a class % of GHPs that are guaranteed to possess nice models. In addition, it is desirable that YZ be decidable. It remains to prove our claim that every well-behaved GHP has a nice model.
We go one step further and show that for well-behaved GHPs, TGtm is nice. We already know that TGTw is a model of G; so this is sufficient to substantiate our claim. Proof. Given recursively enumerable set W, we can find an ordinary definite clause program P such that TpTw is recursively isomorphic to W (cf. [2] ). Obtain GHP G from P by annotating all the atoms in P with t, and by adding the unit gh-clause p(a) : f C=. Then TGTw is a nice model of G iff p(a) cz TpTw. It follows, by standard techniques of recursion theory, that the problem of whether TGTw is a nice model of G, and hence by Lemma 5.4, the problem of whether G has a nice model is II:-complete. 0 This is not a problem to worry about too much. We observe, for example, that deciding whether a classical logic program [18] is canonical
[16] is II:-complete. Thus, we are forced to try to define recursive subsets of NICE(G).
Theorem 5.6, together with the fact that T,Tw is recursively enumerable, entails that the set NICE(G) is II:-complete. In this case, TGtw = A, while T&J(p(a)) = t. A E B,, A # p(a), T&w(A) = 1. However, T,Jw(p( a) Note that all literals occurring in a GHP are well annotated.
For every ground atom
Hence, Z_L f T. Thus, every supported model must be nice. We now investigate the relationship between the fixpoints of T, and the supported models of G. Z is a supported model of 14. TGJ,w is the greatest (nice) supported model of G if G is a canonical well-behaved GHP.
Proof. Since G is canonical,
TGJw is a fixpoint of TG, which must be the greatest fixpoint of TG as TG is monotonic. Since G is well-behaved, TG&w is nice. Thus, TGJ,w is the greatest supported model of G. 0
With this, we conclude our declarative characterization of GHPs. The fact that TGJ,w is a supported nice model of G (G a canonical well-behaved GHP) is useful in characterizing the use of GHPs in reasoning about beliefs [9] . A more comprehensive discussion of decent GHPs is included in [9] . In addition, we have proved that the least model of a GHP is recursively enumerable and that when G is well behaved, the least model of G coincides with the least nice model of G (Theorem 5.5). We now investigate the operational semantics of GHPs which bears some similarity to the approach of Van Emden [25] for a quantitative deduction.
6. Operational semantics for GHPs Definition 6.1. Suppose G is a GHP, A is a (not necessarily ground) atom in the language of G, and Z..L an annotation. We define an and/or tree T( G, A: /.L) as follows: (1) The root of T ( G, A : TV) is an or-node labelled A : /-L. (2) If N is an or-node, then it is labelled by a single annotated literal.
(3) Each and-node is labelled by a gh-clause from G and a substitution.
(4) Descendants of an or-node are and-nodes and descendants of and-nodes are or-nodes. (5) If N is an or-node labelled by B: (Y (a # i) , and if CO is an instance of a gh-clause C in G of the following form:
where /3 S= a, then there is a descendant of N labelled by C and 0. An or-node with no descendants is called an uninformative node. (6) If N is an and-node labelled by the gh-clause C and the substitution 8, then for every annotated literal B: y in the body of C, there is a descendant or-node labelled Be: y. An and-node with no descendants is called a success node. Associated with every node N in the and/or tree T ( G, A, p) is a truth value v(N) called the value of that node. v is defined as follows: If N is a success node labelled B : $, then u(N) = $. If N is an uninformative node, then v(N) = 1. If N is an or-node that is not uninformative and its descendants are N,, . . . , Nk, then v(N) = lub{v(N,), . . . , u(N,)}.
If N is a non-terminal and-node labelled with the gh-clause Before proceeding to investigate the soundness and completeness of the and/or tree search procedure just described, we give an example. Consider the problem of checking whether p( b) : t is satisfied by TGTw. The and/or tree associated with this problem is shown in Fig. 2 . We see that the truth value of p(b) in TGTw is t. Definition 6.3, A GHP G is said to be covered if every variable symbol that occurs in the body of a gh-clause C E G occurs in the head of C. Theorem 6.4. If G is a covered GHP, A E B, and if T( G, A: p) is finite with root
R, then v(R) < T,Tw(A).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1' of Van Emden [25] . Observe that the proof in [25] applies only to covered rule sets. 0
The reason for introducing covered GHPs is due to the following GHP Q and and/or tree. of this tree is t. For covered programs, the atoms occurring in OR-nodes of and/or trees are ground. This restriction to analogously defined covered rule sets is also necessary for the theorems of [25] . Theorem 6.6. If G is a GH P, A E B,, and 
if .Y( G, A : p) is jinite with root R, then v(R) z= T,Tw(A).
Proof. Let R be the root of Y ( G, A : p,) . It suffices to prove by induction that 
If R is a covered GHP, A E BG and Y(G, A : p) is.finite, then v(R) = T,Tw(A) where R is the root of F(G, A: p).
As in the case of [25] , the restriction to finite and/or trees seems to be necessary. The following question then arises: Question 6.8. Can an SLD-resolution like proof procedure be given for GHPs?
The answer to this question seems to be "NO". This is because a certain amount of breadth-oriented search seems necessary in order to compute
T,Tw(A)
for A E Bc. However, in the case of well-behaved GHPs, it does seem to be possible to define an SLD-resolution like proof procedure.
SLDnh-resolution for well-behaved GHPs
Recall that a literal is well annotated if the annotation is either t or f. A query is the existential closure of a conjunction of w-annotated literals. From here on, when discussing queries, we will often write them as a conjunction of w-annotated literals and assume all variables in it to be implicitly existentially quantified. ~18~ . . . & A,_, : pi_, & B, : $, & . . . & B,: & & A,+, : pi+, & . . . & Ak : pk) O where p + p, and f3 is the most general unifier of D and A;. (Without loss of generality,
we assume that C and Q contain no variable symbols in common, i.e. we assume that they have been standardized apart, cf. Lloyd [18] .) Ai : pi and D: p are called "the literals nh-resolved upon" ("nh" stands for "non-Horn"). Note that an nh-resolvent is always a query. where Qr+, is the nh-resolvent of Qr and C,,, and C,,, is a renamed version of some gh-clause in G such that C,,, has no variable symbols in common with any of Qo, . . . , Qr, G, . . . , C, and or+, is the most general unifier of the literals nh-resolved upon.
3. An SLDnh-refutation of the initial query QO is a finite SLDnhdeduction (Qo, C,, W, . . . , (On, Cn+, , en+,) such that the result of resolving Q,, and Q,,+r is the empty gh-clause. Associated with every SLDnh-refutation is a path called the SLDnh-refutation path. Figure 4 gives the SLDnh-refutation path associated with the above SLDnh-refutation. We now address the soundness of SLDnh-resolution. (Qo, C,, 'A>, . . . , (On, Cm+, , on+,>.
We will show by induction on n that Totw k 3(Q,). Base case (n = 0): Then the nh-resolvent of Q. and C, is the empty query, i.e. Q,, is a unit conjunction (i.e. A, :p,) and C, is a unit gh-clause, i.e. C, is of the form A': j3 G= where p > p, and A, 0, = A'B,. As TGTw is a model of the GHP G, it must be a model of C, , and so it must be true that for every ground instance ,:p,&...&Ai~,:pI~,&E,:cCI,&...&E,:~,&A,+,:p,+,&...&A,,,:p,,) (3)(A,:p,   &. . .&A,:p,)O,. q
Notice that the soundness theorem above does not restrict the GHP to covered GHPs. However, this restriction is needed for our completeness result. = (A,: p, &. ' . & A,,, : p,) be a ground query that is satisfied by T G w. Then there must be some n > 0 (as t pI # I for all i) such that T,Tn I= Qo. We will prove by induction on n that an SLDnh-refutation of Q. from G exists. t. The latter succeeds, but the former does not. This is despite the fact that the above GHP expresses inconsistency via the fifth and sixth clauses. This is a GHP that expresses inconsistency via the annotations, but is not inconsistent in the classical sense (i.e. it has models, and does not entail everything).
Summary and future work
We have developed a fixpoint semantics for arbitrary sets of clauses. Based upon the intuitive connection between arbitrary sets of clauses and positive GHPs, we have given a means of associating a fixed point semantics with sets of arbitrary clauses. It is clear that a GHP that expresses inconsistency via the annotations need not be classically inconsistent (in terms of having no models). Example 7.6 amply demonstrates this fact. Thus, GHPs provide a theoretical framework for mechanical reasoning in systems that are inconsistent. Some open problems remaining are:
Problem 1. Can we find a recursive class of GHPs that (strictly) includes the class of well-behaved GHPs, while still guaranteeing existence of a nice model? Problem 2. How much can the covering condition used in the completeness result of SLDnh-resolution be weakened? In view of the very strong conditions imposed on completeness results for SLDNF-resolution for general logic programs [5, 6] it should not be surprising that we have such a restriction in Theorem 7.5.
